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The debate on Habermas and literature, recently reignited by contributions from Pieter Duvenage,1 Lambert 
Zuidervaart,2 Nikolas Kompridis,3 David Coclasure4 and Nicholas Hengen-Fox,5 has sparked considerable in-
terest amongst literary critics. The Frankfurt School is, after all, one of the major progressive alternatives to 
Francophile post-structuralism and its sequelae, a real “road not taken” in Anglo-American literary-critical 
discourse. In particular, the positions worked out by Habermas represent a sophisticated, emancipatory social 
philosophy, one that defends not only the “specificity of the aesthetic,” but indeed the possibility that literature 
is rational. At the same time, efforts to develop a literary criticism from communicative premises have lately 
been sharpened by recognition that his aesthetics represents an acutely problematic region. In particular, the 
question of the nature of literature focuses theoretical difficulties that radiate outwards into Habermas’ main 
area of present engagement, in hugely influential recent contributions to the philosophy of religion.6 At least 
within the Frankfurt School’s research program, then, literary criticism and philosophical inquiry both have a 
significant interest in working out the relation between communicative action and the literary work. 
The main problem for anyone working on the topic of literary rationality, however, is that Habermas has not 
one, but two different positions on the nature of the literary work—and he believes that they are antitheti-
cal. Initially, he positioned literary works as forms of reflexive critique, making contributions to a distinctive 
aesthetic rationality by staking claims to be authentic works of art. Subsequently, Habermas decided that they 
engage in an imaginative form of language-use entirely unlike reasoned dialogue, releasing the rhetorical and 
figurative potentials of language in order to disclose new “worlds” of meaning and perception. The first pro-
posal involves a domain of truth within the differentiated validity claims of communicative reason, specifically, 
articulations of the validity claim to aesthetic authenticity. The second suggestion relates literary works to the 
“truth potential” of imaginative disclosures, which do not directly represent truth claims, but perhaps facilitate 
the making of such claims. 
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Accordingly, and despite Duvenage’s proposal for the reciprocity of critique and disclosure,7 debate has tended 
to polarise around the apparently opposed alternatives outlined by Habermas. Locating literature within com-
municative action brings it into contact with the possibility of influencing the public sphere, because it can be 
seen to articulate new interpretations of the subjective world of modern agents that might lead them to refor-
mulate general interests in democratic deliberations.8 Identifying literature with imaginative “world-disclo-
sure,” by contrast, connects its holistic representations of experiential complexes to the experimental process 
of semantic innovation, as well as to the participatory construction of meaning best articulated by reception 
aesthetics.9 The weight that Habermas himself gave to critiques of his communicative perspective on literature 
by Martin Seel and Albrecht Wellmer, added to the influential misreading of his position by Jonathan Culler 
and John B. Thompson as involving embarrassingly outdated reference to authorial sincerity, make defending 
the idea of literary truth claims seem like a difficult task.10 Yet it can certainly be argued that artistic rationality 
is not only an integral part of the architecture of communicative reason, but that the validity claim to aesthetic 
authenticity can be defensibly reconstructed. There can be no doubt that literary works disclose worlds. But—
contra Habermas—their reception as contributions to the “republic of letters,” articulating a specific kind of cri-
tique of matters of public interest, is not thereby negated. Frustrated by what I see as a false dichotomy between 
literature as rational critique and literature as imaginative vision, I have already philosophically defended the 
positioning of literary works within rational argumentation as a legitimate moment of a communicative liter-
ary criticism.11 In this article, a companion piece to the earlier essay, I want to show how the proposed critical 
approach works in mainly literary terms, while extending the philosophical reasoning of the initial piece. Now, 
the most efficient way to simultaneously exhibit the philosophical stakes involved here while showing that this 
approach constitutes a plausible literary-critical method is to return to the moment when critique and disclo-
sure diverged in Habermas’ work. As is well known, in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Habermas 
criticises Derrida’s strategy of deconstruction on grounds that it drastically inflates linguistic world-disclosure, 
thereby transforming philosophical argumentation to a species of literary rhetoric.12 Less well known is that 
Habermas thinks that Italo Calvino’s If on a Winter’s Night a Traveler (hereafter, WN) is a more consistent ap-
plication of this programme than Derrida’s philosophical interventions.13 Practically unknown is the fact that 
this reading of Calvino was the moment in which Habermas definitively excluded narratives—including, as 
it turned out, both literary fictions and religious mythologies—from the domain of reasoned argumentation.   
On Habermas’s interpretation, Calvino’s novel attempts to exploit the potentials of literary disclosure in order 
to create a “generalised textuality” that swallows the world whilst subverting efforts to ground any determinate 
reading in aesthetic authenticity or authorial sincerity. For Habermas, the novel not only executes the decon-
structive program in a literary form—it also hilariously debunks the idea of literature as critique. As the fabri-
cator of apocryphal texts in the novel, Marana, notes of the author of inauthentic literature, Flannery: who on 
earth, in a vertiginously self-reflexive world composed entirely of literary fictions, would expect a “cataclysm 
of truth” to emerge from the “crisis of falsehood” (131)?14 
An interpretation of the novel as a sustained meditation on the connection between authentic literature and the 
desire to read, then, might seem rash15—yet that is exactly what I propose to do here. But in a novel composed 
of ironic reversals, literary auto-referentiality and metafictional self-reflexivity, we should not be surprised if 
the perspective of Marana and Flannery is not exactly the last word in what makes literature worthwhile. If this 
(extremely demanding) instance of contemporary literature can plausibly be interpreted from the communica-
tive perspective, then this will not only clarify how the authenticity claim might work under difficult circum-
stances, but it will also show what is missing from Habermas’ exclusive focus on literary world-disclosure. 
Literature is not just about exploring language for its own sake. It also clarifies those authentic desires that have 
been silenced in contemporary cultural formations. To arrive at this point will require detailed engagement with 
the rigorous protocols of both literary criticism and philosophy, but I will attempt to explain terms of art and 
to signpost the disciplinary significance of key moves throughout. Fortunately, once we get there, it will turn 
out that one other interpreter of WN does agree with the proposed perspective, but the reader will have to wait 
until the end to discover who it is.
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LITERARY RATIONALITY—TRUTH CLAIMS, OR IMAGINATIVE DISCLOSURES?
To fully grasp the intellectual stakes in the proposed reading of Calvino, it is necessary to understand the sup-
posed opposition between literature as critique and literature as disclosure in philosophical terms. 
According to Habermas’s position on communicative reason, literary works are forms of reflexive critique that 
explore the nature of subjectivity and the means of its expression, thereby staking aesthetic validity claims to 
artistic authenticity. This position involves a claim that contemporary literary works contribute to cultural ratio-
nalisation by experimenting with post-traditional need-interpretations, thereby facilitating learning processes 
that develop the ego maturity of modern individuals. The argument here is that:
The power and significance of autonomous art is its capacity to bring into communicative circulation 
those linguistically excommunicated need-interpretations, those desires and feelings, which were 
split off in the process of socialisation. This happened because socialisation involved the internation-
alisation of the expectations of others, framed not as intersubjective agreements, but as quasi-natural 
imperatives backed by superego recriminations. The strong feelings that autonomous art unleashes 
are the product of its expression of these needs in ways that interrogate quasi-natural cultural tradi-
tions and rigid ego identities, thereby potentially catalysing a dramatic alteration in the motivational 
dispositions of modern individuals.16 
 
On this kind of interpretation, although literary works contain complexes of cognitive, normative, ethical and 
expressive elements, the evaluative task of literary criticism is to assess these complex wholes as proposals 
about the links between need-interpretations and legitimate forms of self-realization.
Yet, as we have seen, according to the position that Habermas subsequently adopted, literary works are forms 
of imaginative world-disclosure, a release of the rhetorical and figurative potentials of language through poetic 
and narrative devices. This results in semantic innovation and a refreshment of perception, but it is difficult to 
reconcile to the analytic argumentation characteristic of critique, because disclosure involves the holistic pre-
sentation of vicarious experiences that contain truth-potential, instead of implying validity claims. In acknowl-
edging a critical point made by Albrecht Wellmer, Habermas sums up the problem like this:
The aesthetic “validity” or “unity” that we attribute to a work of art refers to its singularly illuminat-
ing power to open our eyes to what is seemingly familiar, to disclose anew an apparently familiar 
reality. This validity claim admittedly stands for a potential for “truth” that can be released only in 
the whole complexity of life-experience; therefore, this “truth-potential” may not be connected to (or 
even identified with) one of the three validity-claims constitutive for communicative action, as I have 
previously been inclined to maintain. The one-to-one relationship which exists between the prescrip-
tive validity of a norm and the normative validity claims raised in speech acts is not a proper model 
for the relation between the potential for truth of works of art and the transformed relations between 
self and world stipulated by aesthetic experience.17 
At the intuitive level, the difficulty is that there appears to be a considerable difference between the literary 
work considered analytically as a disciplined exploration of contemporary subjectivity—say, in critical dis-
course (critique)—and the imaginative participation in the fictional world that happens in aesthetic reception—
say, in everyday reading (disclosure). In advocating a disclosive model, it appears that Habermas thinks that 
the situation of a literary work is the totality of a holistic pre-understanding of the world that is invoked by a 
disclosure and whose truth potential is redeemed as a possible form of existence through its integration into the 
life histories of individuals.18 The problem, as Habermas sees it, is that if aesthetic reception involves holistic 
experience, “then aesthetic reception cannot also involve rational critique, because rational critique is—for 
Habermas—specialised with respect to a validity claim and specific to the world modality—subjective, social 
or objective—thereby constituted as its extensional domain”.19 
Granted, there can be no doubt that literary works involve linguistic disclosure and that the act of reading 
engages holistic experiences based in imaginative participation, as specified by reception aesthetics.20 The 
question is whether acknowledgement of this fact logically excludes the possibility that literary works simul-
taneously involve critique. That is, does recognition of semantic innovation in the intensional totality of the 
work preclude the existence of an extensional domain? In terms of the way that Habermas has set the problem 
up, this reduces to the following: given that reading involves the experience of holistic meaning complexes that 
fuse cognitive, normative, ethical and expressive validity claims, is there any way to analytically separate these 
claims and evaluate their accuracy, rightness, appropriateness or truthfulness? Simply put, does literature, in the 
process of imagining worlds, represent anything at all—or is it pure linguistic self-reference?
The problem can be resolved once we see that validity claims are specialised, not exclusive, and that authentic-
ity claims involve a complex interplay of other types of validity claim. A differentiated cultural value sphere, 
such as that of modern autonomous art, does not exclude questions of the accurate representation of the world 
or the normative rightness of ethical values. It simply prevents these validity claims from disruptively predomi-
nating in the logic of value enhancement in the aesthetic domain, by refusing the evaluation of literary works in, 
say, ethical terms. So, for instance, the struggle of literary criticism from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twenti-
eth centuries, to protect works from obscenity trials and then from censorious judgement, is not about the claim 
that works have no ethical dimension. It is about the claim that a work’s morality is not the basis for its value. 
Authenticity claims are a complex kind of meta-claim that, although they have genetic roots in self-expression, 
work quite differently to claims to subjective truthfulness. What is at stake in an authenticity claim is the his-
torical legitimacy of a form of individual or collective self-realization: this depends on establishing a relation 
between cultural interpretations of (historically variable) human needs and the socially accepted forms of self-
realization supposed to satisfy these needs in light of shared values.21 While authenticity claims can involve 
conformity to accepted standards, in modernity they generally involve the claim to have broken the rules in an 
exemplary way, in a way that while releasing new potentials for selfhood also sets new standards which should 
be acceptable to all (within a community).22 Artistic authenticity involves a representation of the connection 
between interpreted needs and ways of life that, in literary works, takes advantage of ironisation and equivoca-
tion to experiment with possibilities rather than to advance propositions. This sets in motion a potential critique 
of the relation between cognitive, normative and expressive components of an historical situation, under the 
predominance of an exploration of subjectivity. The role of literary criticism is to:
argumentatively redeem the authenticity claim that artworks implicitly (“mutely,” Adorno would 
say) articulate, by exhibiting these before a potentially universal audience as well-formed and 
intelligible instances of cultural need-interpretations, whose legitimacy potentially transcends this 
or that particular community. Once the artworks in question themselves articulate post-traditional 
need interpretations, then the interpretation of these works as symbolically coherent and culturally 
legitimate has directly universal implications … The contemporary form of the authenticity claim 
that art criticism redeems is therefore the claim that a symbolic construct: (1) innovatively presents 
a post-traditional need interpretation; which, (2), everybody can potentially feel, irrespective of 
cultural background.23 
Literary authenticity means an exploration in depth of a real aspect of subjectivity or a new aesthetic possibil-
ity that deserves public attention, because, in essence, it interprets needs in a fresh and important way. 
Now, given that this approach is not too distant from that of Habermas himself,24 it is worth asking why he 
rejects it in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. The answer, surely, is that his argumentative strategy 
is to drive a wedge between literary rhetoric and philosophical truth. As Habermas understands it, Derrida 
seeks to escape from the performative contradiction inherent in the total self-critique of reason, by relaxing 
the consistency requirement on philosophical discourse.25 The collapse of the distinction between logic and 
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rhetoric that deconstruction engages in is achieved through an intermediate step, which involves denying the 
distinction between literary criticism and literature itself.26 In turn, this aestheticisation of reason means a 
conflation of the world-disclosing function of poetic language with the prosaic coordination of action through 
everyday communication. The result is a drastic inflation of world-disclosure into a world-constituting capac-
ity of poetic language, in a way that prevents the correction of false knowledge through scientific research and 
moral argumentation.27 The materiality of the world is swallowed by a “general text” that engulfs the speaker, 
the interlocutor and the referent, releasing a para-literary semiotic playfulness that licenses scepticism at the 
expense of argumentatively redeemable truth claims. 
Keen, then, to assign disclosure to literature and critique to philosophy, Habermas is prepared to accept the 
“collateral damage” to his communicative position on literary works that this entails. 
Additionally, in Calvino’s WN, Habermas appears to think that he has encountered a text that engages in an 
exemplary disclosure of how, in literature, it’s “inauthenticity all the way down”. Against the background of 
Calvino’s literary criticism, and reading WN philosophically, Habermas argues that the writer’s effort is di-
rected to exploring a deconstructive generalised text. Calvino, Habermas argues, “who participates above all in 
the French discussion” around the world-disclosing potential of poetic language, “is interested in the question 
of whether a text could be reflexive in such a way that it could … absorb everything that is real … [and] expand 
into a totality”.28 Notoriously, Calvino’s novel includes the reader in the text as a character (the Reader), and 
directly addresses the reader in the text while speaking in the first person (“I,” “you”). Furthermore, WN is a 
book whose fragmentary narrative and metafictional commentary seem to deliberately frustrate any interpretive 
strategy that seeks to locate a master-code on which to base an argument about the novel’s referent. For Haber-
mas, this programme—to include the world in the text—is announced in the novel’s celebrated opening, (“You 
are about to begin reading Italo Calvino’s new novel, If on a Winter’s Night a Traveler. Relax. Concentrate. 
Dispel every other thought” (9)), and it is apparently summed up by the ludic postmodern cogito proposed in 
the work: “it writes … I read, therefore it writes” (139).29 For Habermas, Calvino’s novel is nothing less than a 
literary experiment in the realization of the post-structuralist intellectual programme.30
But, Habermas announces triumphantly, Calvino’s effort to include the world in a general textuality that levels 
out distinctions between reflexive argumentation, everyday speech and literary language, is forced to announce 
its own limits in problems of address that vitiate the novel’s conclusion. On Habermas’s interpretation, the 
experiment fails because the narrative cannot sustain the resulting tension between the (extra-textual) reader 
as potentially anyone and the character of the reader as a specific individual.31 The “dynamic of the action … 
moves the second-person pronoun further and further into the vicinity of a proper name,”32 something that the 
grammatical splitting of the reader into male and female readers, resulting in two characters, does not solve. 
Instead, with the character of the female reader, Calvino merely depicts, but cannot perform, the disappearance 
of the extra-textual reader into the world of the text.33 Fundamentally, the character of the Reader, the one who 
reads the character of the Other Reader in the text, cannot be at once a character in the novel and the person 
external to the novel who reads it. 
CROSSED HIERARCHIES AND NESTED ONTOLOGIES—ON LITERARY WORLDS
As a moment in an argument about the non-literal and metaphorical nature of literary rhetoric, there is some-
thing surprisingly literal about Habermas’s reading of WN. This is all the more astonishing in light of the 
fact that WN positively screams its fictional status as an encyclopaedia of literary forms with the capacity to 
generate bewildering ontological loops, within what appears to be a combinatory aesthetic. By the term of 
literary-critical art, “ontological loops,” I mean the way that the narrative systematically violates the normal 
distinctions and relations between the author, the narrator, the characters, and the characters that these charac-
ters invent and narrate. By a “combinatory aesthetic,” I mean a recognised, specific form of contemporary lit-
erature that explicitly adverts to its own narrative as a set of permutations and combinations of some elementary 
formal possibilities. It would therefore seem useful to read Calvino’s novel as literature for a moment, before 
stampeding to extract some philosophical propositions from its logical self-immolation. This will provide some 
preliminary grounds for thinking that the communicative reading of the novel might be plausible after all, while 
also serving the valuable end of describing the narrative for those who have not had the opportunity to study 
WN in detail. 
A helpful starting point in analysing the novel is provided by Brian McHale’s notion of “limit modernism,” as 
defined by the moment when an epistemological dominant is radicalised to the point of ontological instability 
within the novelistic diegesis.34 Calvino’s book can be described as consisting of three hierarchical ontological 
levels. It is the purpose of the radical epistemological uncertainty around the narrator’s identity, and around 
what the relation is between nested narrative fragments and the main world of the novel, to systematically 
confuse, or at least, complicate, this ontological hierarchy. I am going to refer to these three levels from now on 
as frame narrative, primary diegesis and secondary fragments. In the frame narrative, “I,” the narrator who is 
perhaps a proxy for the author, tells “you,” the extra-diegetic reader, that he (probably he, for reasons explained 
below) is recounting Italo Calvino’s new novel, WN. Within the primary diegesis of the novel, “you,” a reader, 
become a character, the Reader [Lettore], who in the course of trying to find the continuations of the beginnings 
of ten books, encounters a host of characters. The sequence passes through the Other Reader [Lettrice] (the love 
interest, Ludmilla), the Other Reader’s sister (the romantic distraction, Lotaria), Irnerio, a luddite Non-Reader, 
Marana, an apocryphal translator and Flannery, an inauthentic author, before finally marrying the Reader off 
to the Other Reader and concluding—as “you,” a reader again—Italo Calvino’s novel. Finally, the novel partly 
consists of ten beginnings of conventional narratives that break off at the moment of suspense, when romantic 
possibilities have appeared in a constellation with the potential for sudden death and the likelihood of rivalry in 
love. The contamination of ontological levels in the novel happens exclusively between the primary diegesis its 
adjacent levels, so that the aborted beginnings turn out to be writings by the inauthentic author, Silas Flannery, 
and forgeries by the apocryphal translator, Ermes Marana, while the frame narrative is anticipated by both (and 
so might be told by either). 
Because this is potentially confusing, and because on my reading everything hinges on the relationship between 
levels, I am now going to recapitulate this in an expanded way, starting at the bottom, while bringing out the 
details necessary to my interpretation. 
The secondary fragments—the ten beginnings of novels—are a hilarious trail of falsehoods: a falsified copy of 
Italo Calvino’s If on a winter’s night a traveler gives way to the Polish novel Outside the town of Malbork by 
Tazio Bazakbal. But Bazakbal’s novel is incomplete, and yields to a rare classic of the literature of the imagined 
Eastern European land of Cimmeria, Leaning from the steep slope by Ukko Ahti, which itself turns out to be 
but a fragment of the classic of the majority language of Cimbrian, Vorts Viljandi (formerly Ukko Ahti)’s With-
out fear of wind or vertigo. And on it goes, in an increasingly delirious spiral of forged novels in mendacious 
translation under falsified editions, all mere beginnings broken off at a structural point that only creeps forward 
across the ten fragments, until it transpires that this trail of fabricated world literature is actually the result of 
the conspiratorial activities of the apocryphal translator Ermes Marana, in competition (or perhaps in collusion) 
with the inauthentic writer of popular fiction, Silas Flannery. 
The secondary fragments are lodged within a primary diegetic world, and the relationship between primary 
and secondary levels is twofold. The key to the relation between secondary fragments and primary diegesis is 
that each aborted beginning responds exactly to Ludmilla’s (the Other Reader’s) declarations, in the previous 
chapter of primary diegesis, about her reading preferences. As Nella Cotrupi comments, Ludmilla’s “appar-
ently insatiable, heterogeneous, and catholic literary appetites provide the spur and the blueprint for each of 
the text’s novelistic fragments,”35 so that, as Marilyn Orr puts it, “the incipits begin to be designed specifically 
according to her expressed formulation of ‘the book I would like to read now …’ as it develops from chapter 
to chapter”.36 Ludmilla comments, for instance, that “I prefer novels … that bring me immediately into a world 
where everything is precise, concrete, specific. I feel a special satisfaction in knowing that things are made in 
that certain fashion and not otherwise, even the most commonplace things that in real life seem indifferent to 
‘A CATACLYSM OF TRUTH FROM A CRISIS OF FALSEHOOD’ GEOFF BOUCHER
me” (28). In response to her declaration, in Outside the Town of Malbork, “everything is very concrete, sub-
stantial, depicted with sure expertise; or at least the impression is given to you, Reader, is one of expertise” 
(32). This is the structuring principle of the relation between the primary diegesis and the secondary fragments 
(see, e.g., 76 and 88). 
But the existence of this structuring principle is accounted for in the primary diegesis through Marana’s desire 
for the Other Reader, because “the secret spring [of Marana’s flood of apocryphal novels] was his jealousy of 
the invisible rival who came constantly between him and Ludmilla, the silent voice that speaks to her through 
books” (126). To interpose himself, Marana brilliantly introduces into her reading an experience designed to 
destroy “the idea that behind each book there is someone who guarantees a truth in that world of ghosts” (127). 
This intercepts Ludmilla’s desire to read with a perfect anticipation of what she demands—albeit as forgery 
rather than truthfulness—something intended by Marana to wean her from reading altogether, and win her 
back to him. Not surprisingly, Marana is aided in the primary diegesis by the complicity of the Non-Reader, 
Irnerio, a person whose relationship to literature is exhausted by the materiality of books, which he uses as raw 
materials for sculptures.
The primary diegesis, then, is a romance narrative between Reader and Other Reader, one with a highly con-
ventional telos in love and then marriage, in which suspense is generated by a proliferation of rivals (Marana, 
Flannery, Irnerio) and the distraction of the Other Reader’s politically militant sister, Lotaria. The Reader 
constantly searches for the continuations of the secondary fragments, which in his world are novel beginnings, 
as pretexts for maintaining a relationship with the Other Reader. As he does so, he discovers that the plots 
(conspiracies) of his rivals are the plots (emplotments) that he reads, traps designed to stop him reading and to 
enable the rivals to read (or be read by) Ludmilla. Overcoming the obstacles in the path of desire and continu-
ing to read are thus one thing, as is successfully managing to read the Other Reader by avoiding the vertiginous 
non-identity that is the Other Reader’s sister. This achievement of a conventional novelistic telos is parodically 
represented in a scene of marital bliss as (what else?) conjoint yet separate reading, in which “you lie down in 
the same bed like a settled couple … [where] two parallel readings … accompany the approach of sleep” (125). 
Just as the secondary fragments are constantly punctuated by ontological intrusions that represent the Reader’s 
reading experience (“The novel begins in a railway station, a locomotive huffs, steam from a piston covers the 
opening of the chapter, a cloud of smoke hides part of the first paragraph” (14)), so too the primary diegesis is 
continually interrupted by metafictional commentary on the Reader’s relationship to the other characters. These 
comments performatively enact the narrative development within the primary diegesis: “Your reading is no 
longer solitary: you think of the Other Reader, who, at this same moment, is also opening the book; and there, 
the novel to be read is superimposed by a possible novel to be lived, the continuation of your story with her, 
or better still, the beginning of a possible story” (30). This ironic performance of what is otherwise a conven-
tional romance accounts for the extraordinary charm of the narration. But unsettling excursions from the frame 
narrative, in which a reader—“you”—is/are reading the primary diegesis and its nested secondary fragments, 
are common at both primary and secondary levels, thanks to the ambiguity of the second person singular as 
universal shifter (you, a reader) and as deictic indicator (you, the Reader). The structure of a second person 
address that reflexively anticipates its own actual reading culminates in the novel’s final words: “Now you are 
man and wife, Reader and Reader. A great double bed receives your parallel readings. … And you say, ‘Just a 
minute, I’ve almost finished Italo Calvino’s If on a Winter’s Night a Traveler’” (205). 
Now, the frame narrative, in which “I” seem to be narrating Italo Calvino’s novel to “you,” is present, as has 
already been said, at the beginning and end of the book, and in the moments where personal pronouns work an 
ontological destabilisation of narrative levels. But it is also present, in the form of self-reflexive moments that 
anticipate the form and content of the actual novel, WN, in the primary diegesis. It turns out that both Marana 
and Flannery, albeit in different ways, have plans for a book that either closely resembles, or is identical with, 
WN. It seems to me that this strand is indeed privileged, for here we touch on the novel’s main plot—in the 
sense of trap, conspiracy. For the notion that “I” am narrating WN to “you,” in the context of a self-reflexive 
diegetic anticipation of this act in the text by characters who are a falsifier of translations and an inauthentic 
author, seems to pose the question: who am “I,” the author/narrator, and can “I” be relied on? This question 
about the relation between the author and the work—an epistemological puzzle in a trap narration about the 
lack of authorial originality or sincerity—is a perfect diversion from a better question, posed equally insistently 
but with less romantic ballast, about the relation between the reader and the text: who are you, the reader, and 
what do you want? As Marie-Anne Visoi notes, although “the narrative voice annihilates authorial power” and 
the reflexivity of the text implies a parody of the reader-as-hero, the ultimate reference of this self-reflexive 
structure is to “our own way of reading”.37 
In fact, Calvino’s novel is saturated with the motifs of reader-response criticism, which is the basic idea that 
reader and writer cooperate in the co-production of a “text” from the literary work, since in light of the under-
determination of meaning that is inevitable in literary diegesis, literary experience can only be completed 
through an active process of interpretation that generates, rather than receives or decodes, meaning. The reader 
response idea of an author-work/text-reader dichotomy provides a useful way to bring out the conceptual im-
plications this proposal that the author-work relation is a diversion from the text-reader relation.  
Starting on the “author-work” side of this opposition, then, WN, in a fairly obvious way, is all about how autho-
rial sincerity is irrelevant to questions of literary authenticity. In particular, the dialectic between Flannery and 
Marana foregrounds the impossibility of grasping a determinate meaning with reference to authorial sincerity. 
On the one hand, the novel trades amusingly on the ambivalence of plot as emplotment and as conspiracy, so 
that the secret society instigated (but no longer run) by Marana means that, for the Reader, “here is a trap-novel 
designed by the treacherous translator with beginnings of novels that remain suspended” (101). Meanwhile, 
although Flannery dreams of a work of convulsive disclosure by contrast with which the rest of his work would 
appear as the fake that it is, this work would be a piece of paradigmatically late modernist writerly écriture, 
something that would be the opposite of authorial sincerity because a form of automatic writing (139). Their 
plots, in other words, militate against authorial intentionality. On the other hand, the novel also trades on the et-
ymological ambiguity of “apocrypha,” as falsification and as the revelation of hidden secrets. Marana produces 
fake translations to defeat the “function of the author”: he dreams of “a literature made entirely of apocrypha, of 
false attributions, of imitations and counterfeits and pastiches” (127). At the same time, completely blocked for 
inspiration, Silas Flannery considers not only an anonymous writing, but that he must write “a crime that is hor-
rible, but which somehow ‘resembles’ the butterfly, which would be fine and light like the butterfly” (136). This 
crime is foreshadowed in the notion that the “author of every book is a fictitious character whom the existent 
author invents to make him the author of his fictions” (142). At this point comes the moment in which Flan-
nery considers partnership with Marana “to flood the world with apocrypha,” “because writing always means 
hiding something in such a way that it is then discovered … because there is no certitude outside falsification” 
(152). The twin plots against authorial intentionality, although they have the surface form of falsification and 
automaticity, have the hidden meaning of a murder—the (by now, banal) death of the author.
Or rather, this horrible crime is a sort of suicide, for significantly, these meditations on Marana’s plan to re-
place literature with apocrypha, and Flannery’s dream of an automatic writing that would be the unconscious 
transcription of the unsaid, both lead toward If on a Winter’s Night a Traveler. Marana proposes “a stratagem 
prompted by the literary tradition of the orient: he will break off his translation at the moment of greatest 
suspense and will start translating another novel … [which] will also break off … and so on…” (100). The 
intention here is to fundamentally disturb the reader’s relation to the author, for “if this idea … succeeded in 
imposing itself, if systematic uncertainty as to the identity of the writer … kept the reader from abandoning 
himself with trust … something would have changed forever” (127). Similarly, Flannery plots “the idea of 
writing a novel composed only of beginnings of novels” (156). Flannery goes on, in fact, to outline the entire 
narrative strategy of WN, up to and including the structure of second-person address and the primary diegetic 
romance narrative between the Reader and the Other Reader. 
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THE DEATH OF THE AUTHOR AND THE BIRTH OF THE READER
A first conclusion therefore imposes itself: WN is about the death of the author as an intentional centre whose 
sincerity guarantees expressive truthfulness. The effect of this, as both Inge Fink and Teresa de Laurentis have 
noted, is the author’s transformation into a function within a combinatory aesthetic.38In literary-critical terms, 
the problem here is that of the “intentional fallacy,” the fallacy of supposing that authorial intention governs 
the meaning of a literary work. Reader-response criticism conclusively demonstrates exactly why the “indeter-
minacy of the stratum of presented objects” (i.e., the incompleteness of every literary world) means that this 
simply must be the case. In line with this, Calvino’s novel ridicules the Reader’s anachronistic efforts to read 
the world in terms of authorial sincerity. But this is not the same as the impossibility of authentic art, because 
expressive sincerity is not equivalent to literary authenticity.
In the philosophical framework of Habermasian theory, the issue is that the literary work does not directly 
invoke the validity claim of expressive truthfulness in the same way that argumentative dialogue about a report 
on the subjective world of feelings does. Instead, literary works non-propositionally suggest that a certain inter-
pretation of the subjective world is plausible—by imaginatively representing it as un-/desirable possible real-
ity—while taking advantage of ironisation and equivocation to distance the author from propositional engage-
ment and to facilitate multiple potential readings. Literary criticism articulates this as worthwhile by reading 
the non-propositional suggestions of the literary work as a culturally-legitimate interpretation of subjectivity. 
At the same time, literary works—as artworks—are positioned in the space of aesthetic value, where criticism 
must demonstrate works’ implicit claims to artistic innovation. In short, the literary critic—a specialised kind 
of reader—redeems the authenticity claim, not against authorial truthfulness, but against the validity of the 
work’s representation of new possibilities for cultural subjectivity, as coordinated with the work’s innovative 
development of the means of artistic expression.    
  
This is why it is crucial not to fall for the lure of Flannery’s diary in the middle of the book, as Habermas argu-
ably does.39 Nothing is more tempting than the trope of authorial sincerity, especially for the inauthentic writer 
in the midst of a spiritual crisis that in part testifies to the persistence of these romantic (and inverted romantic) 
conceptions of literature. The diary records Flannery’s ruminations on reading and writing in terms of a desire 
to break through the dialectic of sincerity and insincerity (the “tormented” and the “productive” authors of 
Flannery’s imagination). For Flannery, this means either a devastating revelation that would annihilate false-
hood to such as degree as to escape representation altogether, or a purely automatic transcription process. Yet 
this is parodically handled in the chapter itself, for it is a sect who believes in UFOs who expect a cataclysm of 
personal sincerity from this crisis of falsehood, while the alternative turns out to be a computer that completes 
novel beginnings through permutations of its library of literary data. Thus, if the frame narration is the level 
at which truth emerges in WN, that truth is most certainly not a rehabilitation of authorial sincerity through a 
sort of liar’s paradox, in which truthful self-expression would reflexively return from the very midst of a novel 
about falsification and insincerity. 
The apparent reduction of the author to a selection function within a combinatory aesthetic means the libera-
tion of the reader—but only under highly specific conditions. It is perhaps to be expected that a novel about the 
love of reading foregrounds reading strategies as a particular concern. WN is, among other things, an almost 
exhaustive inventory of critical methods and readers’ approaches. These approaches range from the doctrinaire 
impositions of structuralism, psychoanalysis and Marxism represented by Lotaria, through the plastic yet naïve 
attitudes of Ludmilla, and the nihilistic rejection of literature by Ludmilla’s friend, Irnerio the Non-Reader, all 
the way to the stubbornly conventional line of the Reader. Particularly in the way that Ludmilla’s readerly de-
mands elicit the secondary fragments, the novel literalises the fundamental insight of reader-response criticism, 
that “reading causes the literary work to unfold its inherently dynamic character” because the act of reading 
realises a meaningful text from the mere signifying potential of the work.40 In this light, we can speak of the 
strategies of Flannery and Marana converging from opposite directions, complementary to their mutually re-
inforcing conclusions. For Marana, the key task in the annihilation of the author is the destruction of the Other 
Reader’s reading, through the devastation of any possible recourse to authorial intentionality. By contrast, for 
Flannery, the union of the authorial function and the ideal reader means a communion of minds that short-
circuits representation completely: “at times I am gripped by an absurd desire: that the sentence I am about to 
write be the one the woman is reading at that same moment. … [W]hatever I may write will be false, a fake, 
compared to my true book, which no one except her will ever read” (135). There is a strong sense that both are 
right: Ludmilla generates the novel fragments directly from her expectations, as these expectations play across 
a repertoire of conventional narrative beginnings. 
But that is not all at what is meant by the liberation of the reader, for these conventional beginnings are parts 
of a trap-novel. The sense in which these ensnare the reader is brought out by Flannery, for whom “for some 
time now, every novel I begin writing is exhausted shortly after the beginning, as if I had already said every-
thing I have to say” (156). In other words, the narrative telos latent in the beginning threatens to engulf the 
narration, catapulting the start forward into the end. It is as if the author and the reader are expert chess players 
for whom the developmental combinatory of openings and endgames is so thoroughly internalised that, after 
a determinate number of moves in any contest, there is no longer any need to play out the empty formality 
of the game itself because the result has become inevitable. Once the beginning itself becomes the object 
of readerly desire, the trap has been sprung.41 In other words, the fact that Ludmilla’s readerly expectations 
generate Marana’s apocryphal fragments, which consist of highly conventional narrative beginnings, is not a 
solution—it is a statement of the problem itself. Again, it is Flannery who brings this out. On the one hand, “I 
[Flannery] am convinced there is nothing better than a conventional opening, an attack from which you can 
expect everything and nothing” (140). On the other hand, “the romantic fascination produced in the pure state 
by the first sentences of the first chapter of many novels is soon lost in the continuation of the story” (140). 
It is precisely in order to defeat such an exhausted conventionality—which also means, diegetically, to defeat 
Marana’s machinations and win the Other Reader from the Reader—that Flannery dreams that he “would like 
to be able to write a book that is only an incipit, that maintains for its whole duration the potentiality of the 
beginning” (140). As Christina Mazzoni notes, WN represents just such a strategy  for sustaining the desire 
to read, which is equivalent to maintaining the potentiality of the beginning, by continuously raising and then 
defeating conventional expectations for as long as possible.42 
A second conclusion therefore appears: that beyond the “death of the author” is supposed to lie the birth of the 
reader—but only on condition that the “author function” manages to sustain the desire to read through literary 
innovation, which means, through raising and then defeating the reader’s conventional expectations.
To say that narrative development is a question of sustaining the desire to read by raising and then defeating 
conventional expectations is to say that, in a novel that had seemed to open up a typical self-reflexive mise-en-
abîme, we have suddenly and perhaps unexpectedly struck bedrock. Although many critics have commented on 
the centrality of desire in the plot dynamics of WN,43 this has not really been connected in the critical debate to 
the question of the conditions of possibility for the novel as a form. Instead, the conclusion reached relatively 
early on in the debate, that parody implies a negative gesture of demystification without any reconstructive 
moment,44 has remained virtually unchallenged. An exception to this rule—a rule that Habermas too follows 
in his reading—is Fink, who argues that despite “the death of the author, and the absence of any univocal 
textual message, Calvino in fact undercuts contemporary theories and re-establishes the traditional hierarchies 
of literary discourse”.45 But Fink’s conclusion is in tension with her recognition that Calvino’s strategy is a 
conventional game played with unconventional means, which implies that his negative gesture opens the space 
for something other than traditional literary discourse. The conflation of an exploration of narrative conditions 
of possibility with a return to tradition is precisely, on my reading, what WN resists.
On this reading, then, Calvino’s WN is not about a particular interpretation of subjectivity linked to a specific 
innovation in the means of its aesthetic expression. It is a sort of “quasi-transcendental” novel, about the condi-
tions of possibility for the novel as a form, where the form of subjectivity involved in reading is connected to 
an innovative form that expresses a compendium of reading positions. More simply, WN is about the problem 
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of sustaining the desire to read.
Sustaining the desire to read as the fundamental problem of narrative is thematised in two ways in WN. On the 
one hand, it is implicit in the secondary fragments. As the topology of romantic encounter in the context of 
hidden danger risks exhaustion, the fragments gravitate toward a new constellation of possible betrayal linked 
to deadly danger for the protagonist. Then, this cedes place to a science-fiction-like threat of annihilation by 
nothingness as words lose their power to sustain literary worlds, and to the self-reflexive trope of the empty 
grave that awaits the protagonist as/at the narrative’s conclusion. The fragments get shorter and shorter, strug-
gling to maintain any suspense as they move in the direction of the tragic motif of the lethal destiny inscribed 
in the reader’s identity.46 Working against this fatal telos in order to sustain desire is the constant alternation of 
romantic betrayal and sexual confusion, that is, the story of the difficulties that stand in the way of the realiza-
tion of Eros, on its way to a goal that converges on death insofar as it must climax, which is to say, conclude. 
On the other hand, this motif of the dialectic of the desire to read as a metaphor for the dialectics of love and 
death is openly confirmed in the way that the primary diegesis literalises the metaphor that all reading involves 
a seduction of the reader. In relation to love, the tropes of courtship, foreplay, love-making and climax structure 
both the relationship between the Reader and the Other Reader, and the narrative progression of the text, for 
both are one in WN. When the Reader and the Other Reader make love, this is a process of “systematic reading” 
(123); like reading, love-making involves “a direction [that ] can be recognised in it, a route to an end, since it 
tends toward a climax, and with this end in view it arranges rhythmic phrases, metrical scansions, recurrence 
of motives” (124). In relation to death, the conclusion of every reading experience as a death of the reader, the 
paradox that the satisfaction of desire is its extinction, is metaphorically represented in the “empty grave” of 
the secondary fragments. Indeed, in the final five secondary fragments, the narrative represents an increasingly 
desperate “attempt to counter impending doom with scenes of last minute rescues”.47 This metaphorically 
represents the threat, lethal to readerly desire, that completion of the novel fragments would coincide with the 
attainment of Ludmilla in a way that would permit no sequel.
DESIRE IS THE DESIRE OF THE OTHER READER
We can make sense of this psychoanalytically, provided that we remain at the most abstract level of the gen-
eralities of a theory of desire. Desire, Lacan argues, is the desire of the Other; conversely, unconscious desire 
is the discourse of the Other. What is meant by this is that desire is self-reflexive and intersubjective. Desire is 
self-reflexive: desire for the other person is desire to be desired; the desire of the other person structures the per-
son’s desire insofar as a condition of being desired is to coincide with the object of the other’s desire. Desire is 
intersubjective: the reciprocally shared desire of the person and the other person, which is ultimately the desire 
of both to be recognised as desiring, is misrecognised as desire for an object that is a culturally accepted symbol 
of successful desire. This symbol is a conventional placemarker for that combination of power, desirability and 
legitimacy that Lacan calls the phallic signifier.48 The desire to be recognised as desiring, Lacan maintains, is 
unconscious, repressed, because it implies the “desolation of narcissism,” the evacuation of the empirical per-
sonality of the individual before the empty, non-empirical, context-transcending part of the subject. This is the 
part of the subject for which authenticity is always a question, because no empirical realization of desire would 
ultimately satisfy it.49 The dialectic between the unconscious desire to be recognised as desiring and the cultural 
symbols of the successful realisation of desire create a scission, experienced by the subject as anxiety, between 
desire for such an object, and the desire to postpone the final encounter, because the realization of desire would 
mean, in fact, the death of the subject as desiring. 
All of this plays out in a transparent way in WN, between the Reader and the Other Reader. If the secondary 
fragments are structured by the Other Reader’s demands, the primary diegesis is structured by the Reader’s 
desire (the Reader’s desire to read, which is also a desire for, and of, the Other Reader). The Reader’s desire 
is stubbornly linear, which is exactly what keeps him on the twisting path created by the obstacles to desire: 
“I like to read only what is written, and to connect the details with the whole, and to regard certain readings as 
definitive,” he says; and yet, he is forced to admit that “for a while now, everything has been going wrong for 
me: it seems to me that in the world there only exist now stories that remain suspended or get lost along the 
way” (203). The Reader desires closure. Specifically, he desires the closure of the novels that the Other Reader 
reads/generates, because these will allow him to read her desire. What he must learn—for this conventional 
romance is also another conventional sort of novel, the Bildungsroman that narrates the (reading) education of 
the protagonist (reader)—is that closure only arrives at the absolute end of any narration, looking backwards 
from death on a life history that has become narrative through its conclusion. Otherwise, desire remains open, 
by postponing closure; when one story ends, another begins.
All of which is to say that, in this comic novel, for generic reasons, love must cheat death. It does so through a 
completion that evades closure, thus keeping open the desire to read. Toward the conclusion of the novel, the 
narrator speculates that “now it is the stories that you [the Reader] live that break off at the climactic moment; 
perhaps now you will be permitted to follow the novels you read all the way to the end” (174). When the end 
arrives, however, it lacks closure, for in the library where the Reader tries to locate all ten fragments, one of the 
seven readers in the library mistakes the list of titles for the opening of another novel, a list whose final clause, 
supplied by the Reader, indicates the desire to go on:
If on a winter’s night a traveller, outside the town of Malbork, leaning from the steep slope without 
fear of wind or vertigo, looks down in the gathering shadow, in a network of lines that enlace, in 
a network of lines that intersect, on a carpet of leaves illuminated by the moon, around an empty 
grave—what story down there awaits its end?—he asks, anxious to hear the story (204).
This moment, where retroactive comprehension precipitates anticipation of a future prolongation, an end with-
out closure, pointing to a new beginning, catalyses a moment of truth in the novel. “The ultimate meaning to 
which all stories refer,” the elderly seventh reader announces, “has two faces: the continuity of life; the inevita-
bility of death” (204). Is this a moment of only apparent truth that is instantly ironised by the conventional (and 
inauthentic) romantic telos of the primary diegesis? 
I don’t think so, for three reasons: (1) the novel links sustaining the desire to read with literary innovation; (2) 
it is literary innovation that allows the novel to indicate beyond itself to the unsaid, to the existential realities 
of love and death beyond representation; (3) this capacity of literature to innovatively illuminate human needs 
through allusion refers us to the literary tradition, so that literary authenticity is not about absolutely fresh 
departures (rules without a game), but about unconventionally refreshing conventional departures (new rules 
for the old game). 
That is not to say that WN, as a novel about reading, lacks any empirical reference. The desire to read that 
sustains narrative development can only succeed through literary innovation, and “innovation” is inescapably 
historical and relational. WN thematises this in the opposition between Flannery and Marana, and especially 
in the way that, although both anticipate WN, only Flannery, seeking to escape inauthenticity, fully concep-
tualises the novel’s structure. Thus, Flannery is the best candidate for narrative voice, perhaps with Marana’s 
fragments nested within the diegesis as subordinate moments. Calvino’s novel locates the problem of literary 
inauthenticity in a particular social and historical context. The opposition between Marana and Flannery is 
located very precisely in the Europe of the late 1970s—a bourgeois society beginning to engage in processes 
of globalisation that are driven by that combination of commodification and technology which, in the literary 
field, appears as a new, global form of the culture industry. On the one hand, there is the translator/agent Marana 
who floods the market with a generic world literature manufactured through the exploitation of a combination 
of exotic locations, distant languages, remote customs and strange authorial names, together with hackneyed 
narrative clichés drawn from the innumerable threads of a culture that can be compiled into a database. The 
truth of this practice is Flannery, a best-selling author whose novels are product placement devices (98). On the 
other hand, there is the inauthentic “productive” author Flannery, from whom novels appear to grow organi-
cally and automatically, like pumpkins from a vine, in response to the ever-same demands of the mass literary 
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public. The truth of this practice is Marana’s machine, which works to select narrative sequences to complete 
novel beginnings by exposing a reader, who is strapped to the device, to sufficient combinatorial possibilities 
to gauge the best choice based on the reader’s encephalogram. The irony is, of course, that neither strategy of 
the Organisation for the Electronic Production of Homogenised Literary Works, works: Flannery cannot write 
because he has nothing meaningful to write about; Marana’s machine consistently fails to elicit a response 
from the constrained reader. The additional irony is, of course, that even Flannery and Marana do not regard 
this as a literary practice: for Marana, the homogenisation of literature is designed to defeat “the invisible rival 
who came constantly between him and Ludmilla, the silent voice that speaks to her through books” (126), by 
destroying the literariness of literature and thus eliminating the need for the author; Flannery, confronted by 
the demand to satisfy the terms of his contract by handing the work over to Marana’s machine, “turned pale, 
trembled, clutched his manuscript to his bosom—‘no, not that,’ he said, ‘I would never allow it’” (98).
In this respect, it is worth contrasting Flannery and Marana’s plots, for what is missing from Marana’s outline 
for WN is the conventional romance between the Reader and the Other Reader. Thus, Marana is excluded as 
a candidate for narrative voice, and the narrative voice therefore escapes from mere conventionality. This is 
true even though Marana’s narrative fragments are included in the novel’s texture, even though the primary 
diegesis involves conventional tropes of romance, and despite the fact that the frame narrative draws upon a 
literary source so ancient as to be one of literature’s (at least provisional) foundations. The implication of these 
characteristics of the novel is the very opposite of what a lazy postmodern reading might take it to be, namely, 
an exposure of the conventionality of the frame narrative as one final sceptical move in a game designed to 
render all meaning indeterminate because epistemologically “undecidable”. For if readerly desire can only 
be sustained through the representation of desire in terms that involve staying one jump ahead of convention, 
but this “one jump ahead” refers us back to the beginnings of literary canon formation in fairytales and folk 
tales, then this is because even a radically experimental, narratively innovative story needs to have content. 
Formal innovation is not enough. Literature must have substance, or formal experimentation collapses into an 
empty formalistic game without the potential for semantic innovation, something that is no different to the dull 
combinatorial aesthetic of Marana’s machine. In the chess game played between author and reader, a game 
that is all about the representation of desire, new moves that break the existing rules are the necessary, but not 
the sufficient, condition for sustaining the development from opening to endgame—for this representation of 
desire must refer to something. 
The author might be a function within a combinatory aesthetic—but this function is one of selection. Selection 
is both formal and substantive. Formally, it involves innovation—for instance, the radically experimental, self-
reflexive narration of WN. Substantively, it involves allusion to existential realities located in the human body, 
which can be conveniently adumbrated by love and death. And there is a link between form and content built 
into modern literary history, something that Peter Brooks’ Lacan-influenced Freudian theory of literature brings 
out. All works, he contents, have a libidinal economy that structures the desire to read through the representa-
tion of the dialectics of desire and repetition. Ultimately, the erotics of the realization of desire after a series 
of delays is in the service of a lethal—because quiescent—closure; and this closure is related to the authority 
of death precisely insofar as what makes something narratable is the finality conferred on a life history by its 
termination. The realist novel of the nineteenth century rushed confidently forward towards the realization of 
desire, only to discover, as conventional repertoires became exhausted, that the delays on the way to closure 
evidenced a structure of repetition working against desire. In twentieth century modernism, narrative becomes 
increasingly reflexive, which is to say, suspicious, about these repetitions, in a shift (if you like) from desire 
to drive:
The plots of narrative have become extraordinarily complex, self-subversive, apparently implausible. 
They have been forced to abandon clear origins and terminations in favour of provisional closures 
and fictional inceptions; their causes may work by delayed action and retroaction; their connections 
are probable rather than logical; their individual dramas stand in uncertain tension with transindi-
vidual imaginings. But if plot has become an object of suspicion, it remains no less necessary: telling 
the self’s story remains our indispensible thread in the labyrinth of temporality. It is of overwhelming 
importance to us that life still be narratable, which may mean finding those provisional, tenuous plots 
that appear to capture the force of a desire that cannot speak its name but compels us in a move-
ment—recursive, complex, unclosed—toward meaning.50
WN arrives late in this process where, in the multiple detours that constitute novelistic desire, something speaks 
in the repetition compulsion that structures these folds. Unsurprisingly, Flannery is preoccupied precisely with 
this “unsaid” to which literature insistently alludes without actually being able to explicitly describe: “the book 
should be the written counterpart of the unwritten world; its subject should be what does not exist and cannot 
exist except when written, but whose absence is obscurely felt by that which exists, in its own incompleteness” 
(136). But it is the Other Reader who outlines the reading strategy that would elicit the unsaid from the written, 
by abandoning “every foregone conclusion, to be ready to catch a voice … from somewhere beyond the book, 
beyond the author, beyond the conventions of writing: from the unsaid” (188-189). Is it necessary to add that 
the unsaid only emerges from the dialectic of desire, itself connected in literary representation to the question 
of aesthetic innovation?
CONCLUSION
That is why, in conclusion, we should be wary of the assumption that, because the frame narrative is based on 
the Arabian Nights, yet another explicit thematisation of the link between desire and reading, that this renders 
WN as a whole inauthentic, because unoriginal. On the contrary: once romantic originality and authorial sincer-
ity are disposed of, the author as selection function invests this decision with the dignity of a reference to the 
perennial interests of all authentic literature. The implication of the continuity between the beginning of all nar-
ration in fairytale and its latest self-reflexive incarnation in postmodern metafiction is that the representation of 
desire as including reference to existential reality is an unavoidable condition of literature. In other words, what 
is parodied in the primary diegesis is self-reflexively endorsed as a formal condition in the frame narrative. It 
is not that the novel advocates bourgeois marriage and conjugal life (Ludmilla), as opposed to, for instance, 
sexual adventures and revolutionary collectivities (Lotaria), but rather that it suggests that love and death are 
the existential horizon of the novel as a form. In this respect, If on a Winter’s Night a Traveler is probably the 
most typical novel in world literature.
Perhaps it is significant, although by no means decisive, that the well-known Italian writer, Italo Calvino also 
agreed that literature’s unique function lies in conjecturing future values in light of what he calls “the unsaid,” 
something that relates to an exploration of subjectivity within speculation on the nature of human existence.51 
As Calvino says, this “projection of desire” involves “the creation ... of a model of values that is at the same 
time aesthetic and ethical, essential to any plan of action, especially in political life”.52 If contemporary litera-
ture indeed engages a combinatorial aesthetic, then this death of the author and birth of the reader is funda-
mentally undertaken in order to release “the relationship between combinatorial play and the unconscious in 
artistic activity”.53 The aim, then, is not a curious short-circuit from deconstruction back to Romanticism, in 
which the text engulfs the world, but to find a voice for “preconscious subject matter”—that is, for an authentic 
articulation of desire.
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